

Van Arty Association and RUSI Van Members News 6 June 2023

Newsletters normally are emailed on Monday evenings. If you don't get a future newsletter on time, check the websites below to see if there is a notice about the current newsletter or to see if the current edition is posted there. If the newsletter is posted, please contact me at bob.mugford@gmail.com to let me know you didn't get your copy.

Newsletter online. This newsletter and previous editions are available on the Vancouver Artillery Association website at: www.vancouvergunners.ca and the RUSI Vancouver website at: <http://www.rusivancouver.ca/newsletter.html>. Both groups are also on Facebook at: <https://www.facebook.com/search/top/?q=vancouver%20artillery%20association> and <https://www.facebook.com/search/top/?q=rusi%20vancouver>

Upcoming events – Mark your calendars

Commemoration Cyprus 2024 – see poster section

- June 07** Wed 'Zoom' lunch meeting
- June 14** Van Arty Assoc AGM 1200hrs on Zoom
- June 21** Museum Planning Meeting 0900-1200hrs
RUSI Vancouver AGM 1200hrs on Zoom - at Armoury and on Zoom
- June 28** Wed 'Zoom' lunch meeting

2023 Support Our Troops Scholarship Program

Ends July 20, 2023 - **See Poster section for details.**

Rethinking British Military Policy

Michael Shurkin Wavell Room May 5, 2023



This Trident Submarine is a Nuclear powered vessel contributing to NATO's nuclear deterrent. Credit: MOD

The debate prompted by the “refresh” of the 2022 United Kingdom Integrated Review is striking for the strong sense of *déjà-vu* it engenders. None of the principal issues at the heart of the debate are new. For centuries British defence policy has hinged on the same basic questions:

1. Does the UK best defend its interests by focusing on Europe or the rest of the globe?
2. What can the UK do to promote the security of its continental European allies?
3. What purpose would a ground force on the European continent serve?
4. How should the UK balance the need to invest in defence with its need to invest in its own economy?

Post-1945, two more questions have become relevant:

5. To what extent can the UK rely on the United States to defend it and Europe?
6. What is the value of nuclear deterrence compared to conventional capabilities?

The policy swings that have marked British policy have resulted, to a large extent, from disagreement about the answers to these questions. Thus, in the immediate post-war years, the British Government eschewed committing land forces to defend Europe because such a policy did not work well in 1914 and 1940. Then, the policy was to retain a robust presence in the Middle East where, it was thought, Britain could contribute more to defending European and British interests than sustaining a significant presence on the European continent. Roughly a decade later, the UK reversed this by committing several divisions on the Rhine. The Falklands War made British policymakers rediscover expeditionary capabilities and the need to be able to do things other than NATO-specific missions, causing the UK to reassess once again what kind of military it needed.

Of course, some things have changed. The UK's estimation of the strategic importance of the Middle East has waned significantly; there is much less commitment to having a presence "East of Suez," and, most importantly, there is no more Empire to defend. Nonetheless, there remains a consensus regarding some things. The country's security depends on that of Europe; it cannot afford to maintain a major land force on the European continent; and its economy depends on overseas trade. Finally, even if Great Britain only retains a handful of minor possessions "East of Suez," China's rise gives the Indo-Pacific, and its sea lanes, has undeniable strategic significance. So where does that leave British military policy?

Both the 2022 Integrated Review (IR 2022) and its 2023 "refresh" attempt to balance Britain's European interests and the Indo-Pacific. The gist of the IR 2022, and perhaps more precisely the associated Command Paper, is that Britain must maintain its nuclear deterrence, notwithstanding the large portion of the defence budget it consumes. British land forces, though necessarily small, need to be flexible and more or less capable of anything. The British Government never knows when they might be needed, where, or to do what. In other words, rather than designing a force for a specific purpose, Britain imagines a force designed without defining its purpose. That complicates planning, even about things like what kinds of vehicles it needs and with what capabilities. Although the war in Ukraine has begged questions about the utility of a small army given the need for mass, the 2023 "refresh" has no answer. Perhaps because a mass army is out of the question, politically speaking, at least. It might help the debate if we address the questions above directly. Does the UK best defend its interests by focusing on Europe or the rest of the globe? Regrettably, the answer appears to be "both." As it always has been.

What can the UK do to promote the security of its continental European allies? This, perhaps, is the most interesting question. The thinking that led to the British Army on the Rhine was informed by the conviction that Western Europe would struggle to defend itself against the Soviets and that a large British military presence would bolster France and keep the Americans committed. Of course, the belief then was that the purpose of ground forces was to hold the line long enough for politicians to respond before any war went nuclear. Some things have changed. Russia is a threat. But it is not the threat that the Soviets and the Warsaw Pact represented. Moreover, today, Poland is on a trajectory to be a major land power, plus Finland and Sweden are on-side and committed to spending a lot of money. France has its limitations (mass) but boasts a top-tier military. Germany? It is hard to say how serious Germany is about getting the Bundeswehr into shape. But the point is that the threat is diminished while European capabilities have grown in relative terms. Therefore, the argument for a British military large enough to keep divisions on the Rhine while conducting “out of area” operations has become less compelling.

What purpose would a ground force on the European continent serve? British divisions would always be welcome. However, their necessity is not clear and it is not realistic for Britain to maintain a large force alongside the other capabilities required. At most, one is back to the model of the British Expeditionary Force of 1914, which was useful, to be sure, but arguably not decisive. The Force contributed to the Allied victory while leaving the bulk of the responsibility on the Western Front on French shoulders. Meanwhile, the Royal Navy kept the Imperial Navy largely bottled up, which was essential for Britain and France’s economy and made it possible for the Americans to deploy and sustain enormous forces. The Royal Navy also enabled Britain and its allies to conduct “out of area” operations in other theatres. Whether these operations contributed to victory can be debated, but at the very least, the Royal Navy allowed Britain to manoeuvre globally.

How should the UK balance the need to invest in defence with its need to invest in its own economy? This is difficult to answer. The Integrated Review is right to emphasise the need to invest in the British economy’s strengths, especially now that BREXIT arguably puts some of the economy at risk. Also, a declining British economy means less resources for defence spending. It used to be true that defence spending helped the British economy because of the industrial jobs it created and the extent to which it fuelled technological innovation. Now that the industrial base has withered, the UK is obliged to buy more of its arms abroad and it is less true. In any case, defence spending must remain within the limits policymakers define.

To what extent can the UK rely on the United States to defend it and Europe? Some bad news: Britons, like all Europeans, must consider that the US commitment to defending Europe is not a given. There is rising isolationism on the American political right, with some questioning President Joe Biden’s support for Ukraine. Over the next few years, this may damage the cohesion of NATO and America’s commitment. French President Emmanuel Macron’s calls for greater European autonomy are valid and they apply equally to the UK. This means Europeans have no choice but to spend more on defence. And yes, Britain would do well to buy European-made equipment, if not British kit.

What is the value of nuclear deterrence compared to conventional capabilities? It has become clear that nuclear weapons do not preclude the possibility even of large conventional wars. Perhaps we will never see another total war in Europe sustained through full mobilisation. But wars large and destructive enough to break the West’s highly capable but small militaries and devastate their economies now appear plausible. This by no means suggests abandoning nuclear capabilities. Not having nuclear weapons means one can be blackmailed by countries that have them. There is no putting that genie back in its bottle. The other risk associated with letting conventional capabilities wither is that it makes the use of nuclear weapons more likely.

The above suggests that the Integrated Review “refresh” remains roughly on the right track. Britain needs a strong navy and air force. It needs a “go anywhere, do anything” military, suggesting it abstain from tailoring its forces for one specific mission, such as fighting Russia on the European continent. That is Poland’s vocation. It should also be the Germans’. Britain should focus on how to help its continental allies by means other than deploying large ground forces. One way, an echo of the UK’s former emphasis on the Middle East, would be to contribute to the fight on Russia’s flanks, i.e. the Arctic and the Baltic coast. Investments in the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force are more likely to be decisive than large ground formations. The Navy has the advantage of being useful in the Indo-Pacific. Another way is helping to keep frontline countries supplied, as Britain has been doing for Ukraine. This raises another challenge that may be more crucial than how many tanks the British Army has: industrial capacity. The problem is less the number of tanks or any other item in the UK’s inventory but rather its ability to make more while furnishing allies. Recent new orders for NLAWs are encouraging but only represent a start. Perhaps investing in surplus industrial capacity, which is costly, is a more sensible approach than investing in inventory.

Ukraine Allies Sent 1550 Combat Vehicles, Vast Stocks of Ammo

David Rising and Lorne Cook, AP Military News Apr 27, 2023



A Ukrainian soldier holds his helmet as he rides an APC in Bakhmut, in the Donetsk region, Ukraine, Wednesday, April 26, 2023. (AP Photo/Libkos)

KYIV, Ukraine — NATO allies and partner countries have delivered more than 98% of the combat vehicles promised to Ukraine during Russia’s invasion and war, the military alliance’s chief said Thursday, giving Kyiv a bigger punch as contemplates launching a counteroffensive.

Along with more than 1,550 armored vehicles, 230 tanks and other equipment, Ukraine's allies have sent "vast amounts of ammunition" and also trained and equipped more than nine new Ukrainian brigades, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said. More than 30,000 troops are estimated to make up the new brigades. Some NATO partner countries, such as Sweden and Australia, have also provided armored vehicles. "This will put Ukraine in a strong position to continue to retake occupied territory," Stoltenberg told reporters in Brussels.

His comments came a day after Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said he and Chinese leader Xi Jinping had a "long and meaningful" phone call in their first known contact since Russia's full-scale invasion more than a year ago. Though Zelenskyy said he was encouraged by Wednesday's call and Western officials welcomed Xi's move, the development didn't appear to bring about any immediate shift in peace prospects. Russia and Ukraine are far apart in their terms for peace, and Beijing — while looking to position itself as a global diplomatic power — has refused to criticize Moscow's invasion. The Chinese government sees Russia as a diplomatically ally in opposing U.S. influence in global affairs, and Xi visited Moscow last month. Stoltenberg said the 31 NATO allies were committed to shoring up Ukraine's military, adding that taking back land occupied by the Kremlin's forces would give Kyiv a stronger negotiating position if peace talks occur.

Ukrainian officials said China's overture was encouraging. Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal on Thursday described the call between Xi and Zelenskyy as "very productive." "I'm convinced it is a good beginning for our relations in the future," Shmyhal said after visiting Pope Francis at the Vatican. But the Kremlin's response was lukewarm. Asked if the call could help end the fighting, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told reporters: "We are ready to welcome anything that could lead to the termination of the conflict in Ukraine and the achievement of all the goals set by Russia." Peskov said the conversation between the Chinese and Ukrainian leaders was "the sovereign business of those countries and the issue of their bilateral dialogue." With battlefield positions in Ukraine largely static as a war of attrition took hold in recent months, Russian forces have kept up their bombardment of Ukrainian areas, often hitting apartment buildings and other civilian infrastructure. At least seven civilians were killed and 33 were injured between Wednesday and Thursday, Ukraine's presidential office said Thursday. They included one person killed and 23 wounded, including a child, when four Kalibr cruise missiles hit the southern city of Mykolaiv, official said. The governor of Mykolaiv province, Vitalii Kim, said 22 multi-story buildings, 12 private houses and other residential buildings were damaged in the attack. Kalibr missiles are launched from ships or submarines, The ones that hit Mykolaiv were fired from somewhere in the Black Sea, according to Ukraine's Operational Command South.

USAF's New Directed Energy Weapon Ready To Blast Drones

out of the sky. *Zzzzzzzzap! Jared Keller Task & Purpose May 19, 2023*

By the hammer of Thor! The Air Force has successfully employed its primary directed energy weapon to knock a swarm of multiple unmanned aerial vehicles out of the sky in the first test of its kind, the service announced this week. The latest demonstration of the Air Force Research

Laboratory's Tactical High-power Operational Responder (THOR), a high-powered microwave emitter designed to take out incoming drones for short-range air base defense, took place at the Chestnut Test Site at Kirtland Air Force Base in April. During the trial, the THOR team "flew numerous drones at the THOR system to simulate a real-world swarm attack," said program manager Adrian Lucero in a statement. "THOR has never been tested against these types of drones before." THOR "was exceptionally effective at disabling the swarm with its wide beam, high peak powers, and fast-moving gimbal to track and disable the targets," Lucero said. First delivered to the Air Force in April 2020 and field tested "in a real-world setting" in Africa later that year, THOR consists of a 20-foot transport container that easily fits inside a C-130 Hercules transport aircraft and can be deployed for use by a pair of airmen within three hours, according to a September report from the Congressional Research Service.



The Tactical Highpower Operational Responder (THOR), a high-powered microwave counter drone weapon, stands ready to demonstrate its effectiveness against a swarm of multiple targets at the Air Force Research Laboratory, or AFRL, Chestnut Test Site, Kirtland AFB, NM, April 5, 2023. AFRL completed a successful demonstration of THOR simulating a real-world swarm attack. This was the first test of this scale in AFRL history.

US Air Force photo / Adrian Lucero.

The Air Force has requested \$87.148 million for high-powered microwave research related to THOR in its fiscal year 2024 budget request, according to service budget documents, up from \$57.623 million the previous year. The funding increase "reflects the development and delivery of a high-priority base defense mission with joint high power microwave defense system with the military services." While there is no publicly released media of the THOR in action, the Air Force released a video animation in June 2021 depicting its vision for it as a quick-and-dirty counter-drone system able to disable targets with more efficiency than traditional air base defense systems or even the high-energy lasers currently in development for other service branches. "There are several drone negating systems available: guns, nets, and laser systems," according to the AFRL. "THOR looks to extend the range to effect and decrease the engagement time over these other deterrent devices. US military leaders have been harping on the threat posed by adversary's unmanned aerial vehicles for years, with former US Central Command chief Marine Gen Kenneth McKenzie Jr calling the rise of cheap and commercially available drones in the Middle East "the most concerning tactical development since the rise of the improvised explosive device in Iraq." "These systems are inexpensive, easy to modify and weaponize, and easy to proliferate," McKenzie said during a February 2021 speech at the Middle East Institute, echoing his past comments on the matter. "They provide adversaries the operational ability to surveil and target US and partner facilities while affording plausible deniability and a disproportionate return on the investment, all in our adversaries' favor."

Drones have proven a thorn in the US military's side since 2017 when ISIS fighters began employing them to drop mortar rounds onto Iraqi security forces during the coalition campaign

to retake the city of Mosul. A few years later, in 2019, the US accused Iran of using a drone swarm to disable a massive oil processing facility in Saudi Arabia. “Although an individual low-cost drone may be powerless against a high-tech system like the F-35 stealth fighter, a swarm of such drones could potentially overwhelm high-tech systems, generating significant cost-savings and potentially rendering some current platforms obsolete,” according to a 2020 CRS analysis of artificial intelligence and its relationship to US national security.

The Air Force Research Laboratory’s Tactical High-power Operational Responder (THOR) developed for airbase defense.

Courtesy photo/AFRL Directed Energy Directorate



Recent years have shown the potential applications of drones in conventional warfare. In the 2020 conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh region, drones performed both reconnaissance missions to support artillery use and strike missions,” according to a Center for Strategic and International Studies analysis. “Unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and loitering munition attacks were able to destroy heavy ground units, including T-72 tanks and advanced S-300 air defenses.” Indeed, that trend had continued through the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which has seen the Ukrainian military aggressively retrofit commercially available small rotorcraft to drop explosives on Russian tanks and troop positions, part of a desperate bid to supplement its existing fleet of military-grade unmanned aerial vehicles, according to recent reporting from Reuters. It’s unclear when the Air Force might officially field the THOR for operational use in a combat zone but based on the past comments from military leaders and the funding increase in the service’s fiscal year 2024 budget request. “THOR was extremely efficient with a near continuous firing of the system during the swarm engagement,” said Capt Tylar Hanson, THOR deputy program manager, in a statement regarding the April test. “It is an early demonstrator, and we are confident we can take this same technology and make it more effective to protect our personnel around the world.”


The Ukrainian Air Force Formed a New Strike Squadron

By Arming Reconnaissance Bombers with British Cruise Missiles

David Axe Forbes Business Aerospace & Defense 28 May 2023

The Ukrainian air force has been ... busy. With a pre-war force of just 125 or so fighters and bombers, the Ukrainian air arm defended the sky over Kyiv during the heady early hours of Russia’s assault on the city in the spring of 2022 and then, after that assault collapsed, shifted its attention to the front lines in eastern and southern Ukraine. In 15 months of hard fighting, the air

force has lost at least half of its pre-war jet inventory—and scores of pilots. But amid this violence, one small community had been relatively idle: the section of the 7th Bomber Regiment that handles the service’s reconnaissance missions. The air space over the Ukraine battlefield has become too dangerous for manned recon flights.



Oleksii Reznikov Photo

Working closely with the United Kingdom, the Ukrainian air force has equipped at least some of the recon section—which flies two-seat, supersonic Sukhoi Su-24MRs from the regiment’s base in western Ukraine—with British-made Storm Shadow cruise missiles. And now the recon pilots are shooting the 1.5-ton, subsonic Storm Shadows at targets as far as 155

miles away, specifically targeting the warehouses that Russian logisticians rely on to feed, fuel and arm the combat battalions. These strikes are part of what military planners call a “shaping operation.” That is, an effort to set conditions for a successful offensive—by unraveling the enemy’s logistics and starving his front-line forces. Ukraine’s long-anticipated 2023 offensive hasn’t yet begun. Fresh brigades equipped with Western-made tanks and fighting vehicles are in place. The spring mud season has ended. The Ukrainians are waiting ... for something. Perhaps for the Su-24 crews to finish plucking at Russian supply lines with their fancy new missiles. The Ukrainian air force had as few as 21, and as many as 25, Sukhoi Su-24M bombers and Su-24MR reconnaissance planes when Russian forces widened their war on Ukraine starting in the early morning hours of Feb 24, 2022.

All the pre-war bombers and recon planes—as many as 16 of the former and nine of the latter—belonged to the 7th Bomber Regiment at Starokostiantyniv air base. In a year and three months, the regiment has written off at least 17 Su-24s, victims of Russian air-defense missiles, mostly. We know for sure the Russians shot down one Su-24MR and killed its two crew over Poltava Oblast in central Ukraine back in October. It’s unclear how many of the other 16 losses involved recon variants. Possibly none. Luckily for the 7th Bomber Regiment, there were up to 47 old Su-24 airframes in storage across Ukraine, many of them at the aircraft boneyard in Bila Tserkva near Kyiv. Technicians have been fixing up these old jets to keep the 7th Bomber Regiment in the war. When the UK government decided, back in February, that it would supply the Ukraine government with its first air-launched cruise missiles, the 7th Bomber Regiment’s Su-24s—specifically, the Su-24MRs—were obvious candidates for carrying the munitions. London in mid-May confirmed it had given Kyiv Storm Shadows and modified existing Ukrainian planes to launch the 17-foot missiles with their 1,000-pound warheads. A photo of a photo that Ukrainian defense minister Oleksii Reznikov posted on Wednesday depicts the Su-24MR with the nose number “yellow 60” taking off with a Storm Shadow under its right shoulder.

UK defense minister Ben Wallace signed the photo to “all the brave ‘few’ who risk all for the glory of Ukraine.” A nod to the brave few Royal Air Force pilots who defended Great Britain

from the German Blitz during World War II. The \$1-million-plus Storm Shadow is a good match for the Ukrainian air force. The missile is highly-autonomous—and thus adaptable to a wide range of aircraft types. Storm Shadow and its French and German cousins have armed Tornado bombers and Mirage 2000, Rafale and Eurofighter fighters. The stealthy cruise missile probably was easier to integrate on Ukrainian jets than were the GPS-guided bombs and radar-homing missiles that the United States pledged to Ukraine starting last year. To make Kyiv’s Sukhoi Su-27 and Mikoyan MiG-29 fighters compatible with the American weapons, contractors improvised underwing pylons and wired them to new displays they installed in the jets’ cockpits. In contrast, missile-maker MBDA—technically, its predecessors—designed Storm Shadow for maximum ease-of-use in what Italian air force test pilot Enrico Scarabotto described as “an incredibly low pilot workload cockpit environment.”

Most of the work of programming a Storm Shadow takes place on the ground, before a mission. Technicians use Storm Shadow’s Data Programming System to tell the missile where to strike and at what angle. Storm Shadow navigates toward GPS coordinates but corrects its course by scanning the terrain passing below it and matching it to known features. As it approaches its target, the missile pops open its nose to reveal an infrared seeker that scans for the target’s heat profile—and guides the weapon to impact. All that is to say, a crew doesn’t have to do very much to launch a Storm Shadow, except deliver it to an initial point that the missile recognizes. Thus, the work of integrating Storm Shadow onto a new plane type mostly involves installing a physical interface—a pylon—and testing the plane-missile pairing to make sure there are no aerodynamic surprises. It’s that simplicity that apparently allowed the Ukrainian air force and its British supporters to form what amounts to a new long-range strike squadron—eight or more Storm Shadow-armed Su-24MRs—*inside* the battle-battered 7th Bomber Regiment ... in just three months’ time. The Sukhoi recon-jets-turned-missile-carriers quickly got to work. Explosions at Russian logistical sites at the occupied ports in Mariupol and Berdyansk in recent days are possible indications of Storm Shadow strikes. Both ports are nearly a hundred miles from the front, placing them beyond the range of most of Ukraine’s weapons that *aren’t* Storm Shadows. Reznikov on Sunday said every Storm Shadow the Su-24 crews have launched have struck their targets.

Vancouver Gunners Website Update

Change of Command Ceremony – 27 May 2023

Additional photos have been uploaded.

<https://www.vancouvergunners.ca/change-of-command-2023.html>

Museum Planning Meeting 21 June 2023

A morning planning meeting will be held from 0900h to 1200h at the Bessborough Armoury on Wednesday, 21 June. We will be discussing the near term (2023) as well as some much longer term possibilities, suggestions, plans and projects for our regimental museum. Participation of current volunteers, and also those that wish to assist the museum in the future, is welcome and we look forward to a very productive and useful morning discussion.

<https://www.vancouvergunners.ca/whats-new/museum-planning-meeting>

Are you a Yorkey?

Check out the webcams installed at Sayward. B.C.

<https://www.sayward.ca/our-community/web-cams>

15th Coast Brigade and 1st Searchlight Regiment Reunion - 11 Apr 1975

An updated photo has been added. <https://www.vancouvergunners.ca/1975.html>

Vancouver Artillery Association Annual General Meeting

Join us on 14 Jun 2023 at 12:00 Noon as we hold our Annual General Meeting via Zoom. More details to follow in the near future.

Officers Mess Newsletters

Past copies of the Officers' Mess newsletter have been uploaded. Check out the events from September 2003 and April 2004. <https://www.vancouvergunners.ca/newsletters---pre-2011.html>

Wednesday Lunch Zoom Meeting. Join us to check up on your old lunch buddies. Click on this link:- This is a new link!

<https://us04web.zoom.us/j/71810323784?pwd=ehLJDhj9zIqI0HvnBIMCYmw0p6ZDwe.1> or use <https://zoom.us/j/71810323784> or use Meeting ID 718 1032 3784 and the secret passcode is 6L6qz0 (fourth digit is a lower case Q and the last digit is a Zero)

Remember – Stay healthy and stay safe!


Who (or What) Is It?



Last Week: The **PZB MS 41 anti-tank rifle**, the world's first bullpup design to enter service (limited). It served with the SS, and possibly other units, but not for long. The rifle was developed in Czechoslovakia at the Ceska Zbrojovka (CZ) factory in Brno. During the German occupation, small numbers of the PzB were manufactured for the Waffen SS. While more effective than the Panzerbüchse 39 rifle because of a magazine being used, it could not penetrate modern armour and was considered obsolete by 1942. The PzB bears a resemblance to a bullpup design. Operating the weapon is similar to how one would operate a Gepárd M1 anti-materiel rifle; turning the pistol grip, which acted as a bolt. In this case, the PzB's pistol grip was turned to the right and then pushed forward. The magazine is loaded in the rear. The concept of the pistol grip acting as the bolt originated in the WWI-era Winchester-Pugsley anti-tank rifle. Wes Krause, curator of the South Alberta Light Horse Regimental Museum, tells me they have one of these in their collection of weapons and it has one of the worst 'kicks' of all AT weapons.

This Week: As mentioned in past columns, we recognize that many of you are, or were when your eyes still worked, modellers, usually of the plastic glue-sniffing variety. Those whose brains weren't affected by the adhesives, or the old toxic enamel paints, will recall that the variety of kits, whilst colourful, was both lacking in detail and variety. In the past, when looking for

something rarer than a Spitfire or a Zero, one would be hard-pressed to find anything other than slightly fanciful, or hopeful American designs, such as the Pogo VTOL fighter, or evil Commie ones like the “Stalin” tank. Now, however, the opposite is true. Not only is there a kit for anything that was even remotely dreamt of by some engineer or mad dictator, but there are kits of items that were used by countries from Leutonia to the inappropriately-named Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, all at a price spotty youth cannot afford.



This brings us to this week’s photo. It is the box art for a 1/72nd scale kit of something few have ever heard of, but maybe our erudite, well-educated readers have. It appears to have been rocket-propelled, and of a vintage before digital photography made everything crisp and clear. But what was it? Did it successfully soar in the skies? You can tell us by contacting the editor, Bob Mugford (bob.mugford@gmail.com), or the glue-addled author, John Redmond (johnd.redmond@telus.net).

From the ‘Punitary’

Why are frogs so happy? They eat whatever bugs them.

Murphy’s Other Laws

If it will blow a hole in the ground, it will double as an entrenching tool.

Quotable Quotes

The greatest glory in living lies not in never falling, but in rising every time we fall.
Nelson Mandela

Wednesday Digital Video Lunch

No need to worry about COVID-19 when you go digital. Pop into our video lunch **at noon** on Wednesdays and say hi. All you need is a laptop, tablet or smartphone. These sessions are being hosted by the Vancouver Artillery Association and are **open to all – especially those who attended our Wednesday lunches.**

Join us to check up on your old lunch buddies.

Click on this link:- **[This is a new link and password!](#)**

<https://us04web.zoom.us/j/71810323784?pwd=ehLJDhj9zql0HvnBlMlCYmw0p6ZDwe.1>

or use **<https://zoom.us/j/71810323784>**

or use Meeting ID 718 1032 3784 **and the secret passcode is 6L6qz0** (fourth digit is a lower case Q and the last digit is a Zero)

The Zoom logo is displayed in white lowercase letters on a solid blue rectangular background.

Zoom is the leader in modern enterprise video communications, with an easy, reliable cloud platform for video and audio conferencing, chat, and webinars across mobile, desktop, and room systems. Zoom Rooms is the original software-based conference room solution used around the world in board, conference, huddle, and training rooms, as well as executive offices and classrooms. Founded in 2011, Zoom helps businesses and organizations bring their teams together in a frictionless environment to get more done. Zoom is a publicly traded company headquartered in San Jose, CA.

Invite 2 friends! We have room for 100! See you on Wednesdays at noon. Bring your own lunch and beverage of choice.

Attendance at this meeting is falling off. If you haven't been on for a while, we miss you so come back and join us.



24 April 2023

Distribution List

2023 SUPPORT OUR TROOPS
SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM FOR
FAMILIES OF CURRENTLY SERVING
CANADIAN ARMED FORCES
MEMBERS AND VETERANS

1. This letter announces details of the 2023 Support Our Troops Scholarship Program available to families of currently serving members of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) and veterans for the 2023/24 academic year. This program is made possible through Support Our Troops, the official charitable cause of the CAF Community. Support Our Troops is supported by donations from individual Canadians, contributions from third party events and external organizations and proceeds from the sale of Yellow Ribbon merchandise. This Program is intended to complement but not duplicate other scholarship programs offered to the CAF Community.

2. This year (2023) represents the ninth year of the Support Our Troops Scholarship Program whereby eligible families of currently serving members of the CAF, families of veterans and bereaved families may qualify to receive a scholarship. At this time, a minimum of seventy-five (75) scholarships are available, ranging between \$500 and \$5000 in value.

Le 24 avril 2023

Liste de distribution

PROGRAMME DE BOURSES D'ÉTUDES
D'APPUYONS NOS TROUPES DE 2023
POUR LES FAMILLES DES MEMBRES
ACTIFS ET DES VÉTÉRANS
DES FORCES ARMÉES CANADIENNES

1. La présente a pour but de vous faire part des détails entourant le Programme de bourses d'études d'Appuyons nos troupes de 2023 offert aux familles des membres actifs et des vétérans des Forces armées canadiennes (FAC) pour l'année scolaire 2023-2024. Ce programme existe grâce à Appuyons nos troupes, l'œuvre de bienfaisance officielle de la communauté des FAC. Appuyons nos troupes est financé au moyen de dons versés par des particuliers au Canada, de revenus générés par des activités organisées par des tiers, de la vente d'articles arborant le ruban jaune et de contributions d'organisations de l'extérieur. Ce programme vise à compléter et non à offrir en double d'autres programmes de bourses d'études destinés aux membres de la communauté des FAC.

2. Cette année (2023) marque la neuvième année du Programme de bourses d'études d'Appuyons nos troupes grâce auquel des familles endeuillées ainsi que celles des membres actifs et des vétérans des FAC peuvent être admissibles à une bourse d'études. À ce stade-ci, un minimum de soixante-quinze (75) bourses d'études variant de 500 \$ à 5000 \$ seront décernées.

3. Registration for the 2023 Support Our Troops Scholarship Program will open on 1 May 2023 at

<https://www.supportourtroops.ca/Get-Support/Education/Scholarships>

4. Applications must be submitted by 20 July 2023 and are to include:

- a. three-part essay;
- b. A letter of reference;
- c. Most recent academic transcript;
- d. Proof of enrollment from academic institution;
- e. A point form list of volunteer/civic engagement activities.

5. Applications will be reviewed by a selection committee and recipients of a Support Our Troops Scholarship will be announced in September 2023.

6. Members of the CAF Community looking for additional financial support related to post-secondary education are encouraged to learn more about [Student Lines of Credit](#) and to [book an appointment](#) with a lending expert from BMO Bank of Montreal.

3. Nous accepterons les demandes dans le cadre du Programme de bourses d'études d'Appuyons nos troupes de 2023 à compter du 1^{er} mai 2023 au

<https://www.appuyonsnostroupes.ca/Obtenir-du-soutien/Bourses-d-etudes>.

4. La date limite de soumission d'une demande est le 20 juillet 2023, et celle-ci doit comprendre :

- a. Une dissertation divisée en trois parties;
- b. une lettre de recommandation;
- c. le relevé de notes le plus récent;
- d. une attestation d'inscription à un établissement d'enseignement;
- e. une liste en style télégraphique des activités de bénévolat/d'engagement communautaire.

5. Un comité de sélection examinera les demandes, et les noms des récipiendaires d'une bourse d'études d'Appuyons nos troupes seront dévoilés en septembre 2023.

6. Les membres de la communauté des FAC qui désirent obtenir du soutien financier supplémentaire afin de poursuivre des études postsecondaires sont priés de se renseigner sur les [marges-crédits aux étudiants](#) et de [prendre rendez-vous](#) avec un expert en matière de prêts de la BMO Banque de Montréal.

7. In addition to the scholarships identified above, Support Our Troops also administers and distributes bursaries from the annual interest generated from the George and Helen Vari Foundation Education Bursary Program. Active members of the CAF who meet eligibility criteria may apply. For more information, please visit: <https://www.supportourtroops.ca/Get-Support/Education/George-and-Helen-Vari-Foundation-Education-Bursary>

8. CFMWS welcomes other donations and contributions to help deliver and expand the Support Our Troops Scholarship Program. Persons interested in this regard are encouraged to visit the Support Our Troops at <https://www.supportourtroops.ca/Give-Support> for more information.

9. I ask for your support in ensuring that the contents of this letter are widely distributed.

7. En plus des bourses mentionnées ci-dessus, Appuyons nos troupes administre et distribue aussi les bourses en fonction des intérêts annuels que génère le programme de bourses d'études de la Fondation George et Helen Vari. Les membres en service actif des Forces armées canadiennes admissibles peuvent en faire la demande. Pour en savoir plus, veuillez visiter: <https://www.supportourtroops.ca/Get-Support/Education/George-and-Helen-Vari-Foundation-Education-Bursary>

8. Les SBMFC invitent toute personne intéressée à verser un don en vue d'assurer la prestation du Programme de bourses d'études d'Appuyons nos troupes et d'en élargir la portée. Les personnes intéressées sont invitées consulter le site d'Appuyons nos troupes au <https://www.appuyonsnostroupes.ca/Apport-er-du-soutien> pour en savoir plus.

9. Je vous demande votre appui pour veiller à ce que la présente soit distribuée à grande échelle.

Le chef de la direction des
Services de bien-être et moral des Forces canadiennes



Ian C. Poulter
Chief Executive Officer
Canadian Forces Morale and Welfare Services

THE ARMY CADET LEAGUE OF CANADA (BRITISH COLUMBIA)



17 May 2023

Dear Sir/Ma'am;

The Army Cadet League of Canada, British Columbia Branch is seeking out assistance from our Regimental Association partners. The BC Branch urgently needs volunteers to assist the Branch as Zone Representatives across British Columbia.

A BC Branch Zone representative is a liaison between the BC Branch and the Corps Support Committee. We work with Support Committees in all 47 BC Army Cadet Corps to ensure that they are trained and knowledgeable in their roles to assist our DND Partners. This will ensure the ACLC can deliver the best possible experience in all of BC's diverse communities and ensure harmonious Corps Operations.

As a Branch Zone Representative, we ask you to make regular contact with the Corps Support Committee by attending meetings, award presentations, and Corps events as required. The Branch will also host an online bi-monthly meeting to provide updates from the Branch and to keep communication open.

We hope you can volunteer with us and make a difference in the Army Cadet Program and your community.

If you are interested in volunteering with the BC Branch, please contact me, the Executive Director for more information.

We thank you for your assistance;


Sincerely;

Elisabeth Mortlock
Executive Director
ACLC BC Branch

724 Vanalman Avenue, Victoria BC V8Z 3B5 250-708-0281 execdir@armycadetleague.bc.ca
<https://britishcolumbia.armycadetleague.ca/>

With a Few Guns

“With a Few Guns” Calling For Support! Donate Now!



With a Few Guns will be an accounting of the contribution Canadian Gunners made to operations in Afghanistan from initial deployment in 2002 until withdrawal in March 2014. The book will not be an “official history” but will tell the story of the approximately 3,000 Gunners who served in Afghanistan, Regular Force and Reserves, in any and all positions, in any and all functions, as well as the stories of commanders and supported arms, and Gunner families.

We have three accomplished and exceptional authors:

Lieutenant-Colonel (Retired) Brian Reid

Colonel (Retired) Wolf Riedel

Mr. Mark Zuehlke

We are launching this fundraising initiative to cover expenses and get the book published, while keeping the price affordable. *With a Few Guns* is being written with the backing of the RCA Association, and all donations will be eligible for a tax receipt. Any monies donated in excess of what is needed will remain with the RCAA for support to the causes as espoused by the RCAA.

Our MISSION is to raise \$75,000 (+)

Questions may be directed to: WithAFewGuns@gmail.com

To Donate:

Go to: <https://rca-arc.org/>

Scroll down to: **Donate**

Go to : The Royal Canadian Artillery Association

Then donate to: RCAA Donation "With a Few Guns"

Commemoration Cyprus 2024



Commemoration Chypre 2024



Commemoration Cyprus 2024



Mission

...commémorer la contribution du Canada à la mission de l'ONU à Chypre à l'occasion du 50e anniversaire de la guerre de 1974.

...commemorate Canada's contribution to the UN mission in Cyprus on the 50th anniversary of the 1974 war.



WHAT - Cyprus 2024 Pilgrimage.

GOAL - to capture the history and stories from those who served in Cyprus with emphasis on the actions that took place during the 1974 war, **A FORGOTTEN WAR.**

WHEN - November 2024.

WHO - All Cyprus and Canadian Airborne Regiment Veterans and family members.

WHERE - Nicosia Cyprus, lodged at the Hilton Hotel.

COST - Pay as you go trip with individual costs in the \$5000 to 6000 range. Costs covered will include airfare, hotel with breakfast and expenses such as transportation.

TRAVEL - Will be arranged by professional travel agents, with pre and post tour travel options available.

PROGRAM - Seven days: three days of battlefield tours, three days of excursions, and one day of Remembrance.

FURTHER INFORMATION AND UPDATES ARE AVAILABLE BY JOINING THE CYPRUS 2024 FACEBOOK GROUP [Cyprus2024 | Facebook](#)

QUOI - Pèlerinage à Chypre 2024.

OBJECTIF - capturer l'histoire et les récits de ceux qui ont servi à Chypre en mettant l'accent sur les actions qui ont eu lieu là pendant la guerre de 1974, **UNE GUERRE OUBLIÉE.**

QUAND - Novembre 2024.

QUI - Tous les vétérans de Chypre, du Régiment aéroporté canadien et les membres de leurs familles.

OÙ - Nicosie Chypre, logés à l'hôtel Hilton.

COÛT - Voyage à la carte avec des coûts individuels inclus, environ \$5000 et 6000. Les coûts comprendront le billet d'avion, l'hôtel avec petit-déjeuner et les dépenses telles que le transport.

VOYAGE - Sera organisé par des agents de voyage professionnels, avec options de voyage avant et après la réunion.

PROGRAMME - Sept jours: trois jours de visites du champ de bataille, trois jours d'excursions et une journée du Souvenir.

PLUS D'INFORMATIONS ET MISES À JOUR SONT DISPONIBLES EN REJOIGNANT LE GROUPE FACEBOOK CYPRUS 2024 [Cyprus2024 | Facebook](#)

